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Abstract
Does a competitive equilibrium in a matching market provide ade-
quate incentives for investments made before the market when utility
is not perfectly transferable? This paper derives a necessary and suf-
cient condition for equilibrium investments to maximize surplus con-
ditional on the matching assignment in a one-sided market. Surplus
eciency of equilibrium payos ex post alone is sucient for surplus
ecient investments only when the equal treatment property holds in
equilibrium. Sucient (but not full) utility transferability in a well
dened sense ensures this will hold and that a social planner who can
only change investments cannot achieve higher aggregate surplus than
the market.
Keywords: Matching, assignment models, investments, nontransfer-
able utility, graph theory.
JEL Codes: C78, D20, D62.
1 Introduction
Do equilibrium allocations and payos in matching markets provide ade-
quate incentives for investments in attributes that are relevant to matching
partners and are made before the market? This is a relevant question, in
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particular for policy discussion concerning education acquisition and labor
markets. For instance, there appear to be widespread concerns that { pos-
sibly because of asymmetric information (see Benabou and Tirole, 2012) {
salaries in the labor market may not adequately reect the social marginal
benet of employees' productivity or human capital, distorting incentives for
education investment. Similarly, when admission to good schools and col-
leges, and thus access to high quality peers in the classroom, is based partly
on parents' income through user fees or house prices in the presence of bor-
rowing constraints, rewards to prior eort in education acquisition or early
childhood investments will be distorted.
The question has attracted considerable attention in the literature. Cole
et al. (2001b) show that surplus ecient investments are in the equilibrium
set when utility is perfectly transferable.1 At the other extreme, for strictly
nontransferable utility, such that surplus has to be split equally among part-
ners, Peters and Siow (2002) establish Pareto (though not necessarily surplus)
eciency of investments in a two-sided matching market, though Bhaskar and
Hopkins (2011) points out the limits of this results. On the other hand, Gall
et al. (2006) provide an example of surplus inecient investments in a one-
sided market when utility is less than perfectly transferable and distorts the
matching pattern. Gall et al. (2009) nds investment distortions generating
surplus ineciency in form of simultaneous over-investment at the top and
under-investment at the bottom, and analyze rematching policies. Mailath
et al. (2012) examine the relation of the dimensionality of the price system
and potential investment distortions in a two-sided market. This raises the
question of the degree of utility transferability required to ensure that in-
vestments maximize aggregate surplus. Evaluating allocations in terms of
surplus eciency appears reasonable from a normative, ex ante perspective
(in the sense of Harsanyi, 1953), and from a positive point of view when
surplus relates to output.
In essence, nontransferable utility may distort ex ante investments away
from the surplus maximizing allocation through three possible channels.
First, with non-transferabilities equilibrium payos may not maximize joint
1This is approximately true in nite economies (Cole et al., 2001a, Felli and Roberts,
2002).
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surplus in each match formed in equilibrium. That is, there is ex post in-
eciency in that given an equilibrium assignment and investments, in some
matches a dierent division of the surplus may increase joint surplus. Second,
payo distortions may cause the equilibrium assignment to dier from the
rst best. That is, given equilibrium investments and payos there may be
another assignment that is not stable but generates higher aggregate surplus,
which may aect incentives. Third, given an equilibrium assignment equi-
librium payos may not adequately reect the externalities that an agent's
investment generates on potential matches. That is, given the equilibrium as-
signment and payos, changing individual investments may generate higher
aggregate surplus.
This paper shall be concerned with the rst and the third channel only;
analyzing surplus eciency of the matching pattern and possible remedies is
done elsewhere (Gall et al., 2009). First, a necessary and sucient condition
is derived that ensures equilibrium investments are surplus ecient condi-
tional on the matching assignment. This is quite relevant, for instance, if
policy determines the matching pattern. Essentially the condition requires
matching market equilibrium payos to coincide with equilibrium payos
when utility is fully transferable, which is stronger than requiring that payos
maximize joint surplus in each match formed, i.e., ex post surplus eciency.
Surplus eciency requires payos to reect the social benet of invest-
ments in a rst best world. A less demanding criterion is whether a social
planner who can change investments, but otherwise remains constrained by
nontransferabilities, can increase aggregate surplus. Indeed, equilibrium mar-
ket prices for attributes correctly reect the actual externalities (subject to
nontransferabilities) of a rematch triggered by a change in investments if, and
only if, equal treatment holds, that is, each attribute obtains the same payo
in every equilibrium match, independent of the attribute it is assigned to.
With equal treatment the law of one price holds, and the market payo for
any attribute in any match reects the actual opportunity cost of foregoing
a dierent match for that attribute. Otherwise, some individuals will receive
more than their true opportunity cost, which distorts investments. Hence,
given a matching pattern, a social planner who can aect only individual
investments cannot increase aggregate surplus beyond what is achieved by
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equilibrium investments induced by a matching market equilibrium that sat-
ises equal treatment. This nding extends to cases where the matching
pattern reacts to changes in investments.
The condition can be readily applied. For instance, one-sided markets
with strictly nontransferable utility (when surplus in a match has to be shared
according to a certain, match-specic ratio, e.g. due to ex post renegotiations)
often have full segregation in equilibrium (i.e. only matches of agents with
the same attributes occur), which trivially implies the equal treatment prop-
erty. Hence, investments in such markets are typically constrained ecient,
conditional on equilibrium assignment and payos.2
The equal treatment property can be tied to transferability: a sucient
condition for equal treatment is that utility is transferable enough to allow
partners in a match to transfer utility to another at a bounded, strictly posi-
tive rate in each possible match of attributes. Strictly nontransferable utility
that yields some heterogeneity in the equilibrium matching typically causes
equal treatment to fail, however. In this case ex post surplus eciency of
equilibrium payos does not imply surplus eciency of investments. Intu-
itively, when equilibrium payos for an attribute dier for dierent attribute
matches, the externalities generated by an agent's change in investment is
not correctly reected in payos as the law of one price fails.
The results are derived in a model of ex ante investments, made before a
one-sided matching market with a continuum of agents. Costly investment
determines the probability distribution over possible attributes an agent may
attain. After attributes have realized agents enter the market, match into
pairs, and jointly generate surplus, which depends on attributes. A match-
ing equilibrium is a stable match with side payments, and equilibrium in-
vestments are optimal anticipating the matching equilibrium payos. Side
payments are subject to nontransferabilities, captured by the Pareto fron-
tier in each match, which may take any form between fully transferable and
strictly nontransferable utility. Surplus in a match may not be monotone and
transferability may vary between dierent attribute pairs, allowing for sub-
stantial heterogeneity in preference over possible matches and preferences for
2This extends to two-sided models when both market sides have the same type distri-
bution as in the example of Peters and Siow (2002).
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attributes need not be aligned.3 The results follow from deriving the graph
structure of the payo externalities of a change in investments and using the
structural properties of an equilibrium match of attributes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and con-
tains a preliminary result when there is full segregation in equilibrium. The
general case is treated in Section 3 deriving the relation of equal treatment
and constrained surplus ecient investments. Section 4 concludes and the
appendix contains proofs and details omitted in the text.
2 A model of matching and investments
An economy is populated by a continuum of agents I of measure one. Agents
are characterized by a type  2  where  denotes a nite set of types.
Before the match agents spend eort ei 2 [e; e] with 0  e < e at cost
c(ei; ). The cost function is strictly increasing in  and e, strictly convex
and dierentiable in e and satises c(e; ) = 0 for all  2 . An individual's
attribute a 2 A, where A denotes a nite set, is stochastic and depends on
eort: exerting eort ei yields probability p(a; ei) of attaining an attribute
a.4 Attribute draws are independent across individuals.
Assumption 1 (Investment Technology). Suppose that
(i) for all ei 2 [e; e],
P
a2A p(a; ei) = 1 and p(a; ei) > 0 for all a 2 A
(probability distribution with full support),
(ii) p(a; ei) is strictly monotone, concave, and dierentiable in ei for all
a 2 A,
For instance, if A = fa0; a1g an investment technology that satises this
assumption is p(a0; ei) = ei with ei 2 [; 1  ] for  2 (0; 1=2).5
3See also Dizdar (2012) for a recent extension of the eciency result by Cole et al.
(2001b) to multidimensional types and allowing for payos that are not supermodular.
4This reduces the problem of multiple equilibria due to coordination failure as noted
by Bhaskar and Hopkins (2011) and has been used e.g. in Gall et al. (2009).
5The form of p(a; ei) is chosen for simplicity. Using a technology that allows to choose
a portfolio of eorts, e.g. one for each attribute with a resource constraint, appears not to
aect the derivation of the results below.
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Invoking a law of large numbers, denote the realized measure of an at-
tribute a 2 A in the matching market given investments e = (ei)i2I by
q(a; e) =
Z
i2I
p(a; ei)di:
Once attributes have realized agents match into pairs. Unmatched agents
obtain payo 0, and a matched pair of agents (i; j) jointly generates surplus
of at most y(ai; aj). Note that no order is imposed on A, that is, y(a; a
0)
may not be monotone in its arguments, thus potentially allowing for multi-
dimensional attributes. In most relevant applications expected surplus will
monotonically increase as own eort investment increases, assume thereforeX
a2A
y(a; a0)
@p(a; ei)
@ei
> 0 for all a0 2 A: (1)
Aggregate surplus in a match (i; j) may depend on its division among part-
ners (for instance due to moral hazard problems in the match, limited liabil-
ity, or behavioral concerns), so that individual payos ui and uj satisfy
ui  (ai; aj; uj) with ui + (ai; aj; uj)  y(ai; aj):
(ai; aj; uj) is the Pareto or utility possibility frontier in a match (i; j), giv-
ing i's maximum payo when j receives uj given attributes ai and aj (the
notation follows Legros and Newman, 2007). Suppose (ai; aj; uj) is contin-
uous and weakly decreases in uj with (ai; aj; 0) > 0 and (ai; aj; u) = 0
implies u > 0 for all ai; aj 2 A. Since transferability may depend on the
match of attributes (a; a0) some combinations may allow for full transfer-
ability, while others do not. This may be a source of gains from trades, as
more transferability with some partner than with another may compensate
for lower maximal joint surplus. Since the market is one-sided, partners in
a match may switch roles so that the Pareto frontier has to be symmetric,
(a; a0; u) = (a0; a; u).
To see that (:) captures the degree of payo transferability in a match,
note that full transferability of utility corresponds to
(a; a0; u) = y(a; a0)  u; for 0  u  y(a; a0):
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At the other extreme is strictly nontransferable utility, e.g., if joint surplus
has to be shared at a ratio  2 [1=2; 1]. Then (a; a0; uj) = y(a; a0) for
uj  (1 )y(a; a0), and (a; a0; uj) = (1 )y(a; a0) for (1 )y(a; a0) < uj 
y(a; a0). The ratio could, of course, depend on the match.
Equilibrium Concept
A matching market equilibrium (u;P) are payos u = (ui )i2I and a par-
tition P of I into pairs preserving the measures of attributes q(a; e), such
that there are no agents i; j 6= i 2 I with (i; j) =2 P and payos ui; uj such
that ui  (ai; aj; uj) and both ui > ui and uj > uj . Measure consistency
ensures the measure of rst members of matched attribute pairs (a; a0) equals
the measure of the second one. An investment cum matching equilibrium are
investments e = (ei )i2I and a matching market equilibrium (u
;P) given
the measures of attributes q(a; e) induced by e, such that no individual i 2 I
can obtain strictly higher expected payo given the matching equilibrium
(u;P) choosing investment e0i 6= ei .
Since matching is into pairs in a continuum economy, existence of a stable
match is guaranteed (see for instance Kaneko and Wooders, 1986), determin-
ing individual payos given investments. This means that the investment
stage is, in fact, an anonymous game, for which existence of an equilib-
rium has been established, for instance, by Mas-Colell (1984). Note that
the investment cum matching equilibria relies on rational expectations of the
matching equilibrium payos given aggregate investments. Therefore there
may be multiple investment cum matching equilibria. Whether a matching
equilibrium maximizes total surplus given the realized attributes depends on
the properties of y(a; a0) and (a; a0), see e.g. Legros and Newman (2007).
An equilibrium partition P characterizes an assignment of attributes 
that maps A into its power set, dened by (a) = faj : ai = a ^ (i; j) 2 Pg
for all a 2 A. Denote the measure of an attribute pair (a; a0) implied by 
by (a; a0). Measures (a; a0) are determined by the system of equations
q(a; e) =
X
a02(a)
(a; a0) + 2(a; a) for a 2 A: (2)
Some form of rationing may be required when (a) has more than one
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element for some a. Assume that agents are assigned randomly with proba-
bilities implied by the relative frequencies of matches (a; a0) with a0 2 (a):
an agent with attribute a is assigned to an agent with attribute a0 with
probability (a; a0)=q(a; e).
For example, let A = fa1; a2g and suppose the matching equilibrium is not
full segregation. If e.g. q(a1; e) > q(a2; e), (a1) = fa1; a2g and (a2) = a1,
measure of matches are (a1; a2) = q(a2; e), (a1; a1) = q(a1; e) q(a2; e), and
(a2; a2) = 0. Matching probabilities are then ^(a1; a2) = q(a2; e)=q(a1; e)
and ^(a1; a1) = 1  (a2; a1), and ^(a2; a1) = 1 and ^(a2; a2) = 0.
Note that, when utility is not fully transferable, equal treatment may
fail. A matching market equilibrium satises the equal treatment property,
if each attribute obtains the same payo no matter which other attribute it
is matched to, i.e.
v(a) = (a; a0; v(a0)) for all a 6= a0 2 A with (a; a0) > 0: (ET)
In case this fails even for homogenous matches (a; a), that is, two agents i
and j with the same attribute obtain dierent equilibrium payos ui 6= uj
when matched together, assign equal probability to each possible equilibrium
payo division in a match.
Equilibrium Investments
An agent's equilibrium payo given attribute a can be written as
v(a) =
X
a02A
(a; a0)E[(a; a0; ua0)];
where ua0 denotes equilibrium payo u

j for an agent j with aj = a
0 in a
match (a; a0) and the expectation is with respect to ua0 in case equal treat-
ment fails for a homogenous match (a; a). Anticipating the market outcome
agents choose eort investments. An agent i's choice of ei therefore solves
maxei
P
a2A p(a; ei)v(a)  c(ei; i). The equilibrium eort choice ei satisesX
a2A
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
=
@c(ei ; i)
@ei
: (3)
E.g., if surplus has to be shared equally, (a; a) = 1 and ua = (a; a; u

a)
implies that v(a) = y(a; a)=2.
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Surplus Optimal Allocation
Compare this to eort investments that maximize aggregate surplus if a
social planner can choose investment levels and the surplus sharing to ensure
ui + uj = y(ai; aj) in all matches (i; j) when the matching is given by (a).
6
The social planner solves
max
(ei)i2I
X
a2A
 
(a; a)y(a; a) +
1
2
X
a0 6=a2A
(a; a0)y(a; a0)
!
 
Z
I
c(ei; i)di: (4)
The optimization is over the investments e of a continuum of individuals, but
note that the type space  is nite and the investment cost convex, while
expected payos are the same for all individuals. Therefore all individuals i
of the same type i will necessarily have the same investment ei in optimum,
and the optimization is really only over a nite vector of investments.
Measures (a; a0) depend on q(a; e), and thus on e, through (2). If the
equilibrium assignment  remains constant, measures (a; a0) are dieren-
tiable with respect to q(a; e) and thus with respect to ei. However, a marginal
change in investment e may trigger a change in the equilibrium assignment
, adding or subtracting a match (a; a0) with surplus y(a; a0), thus altering
(2) dening the measures (a; e). This will induce a discrete change in the
marginal social benet of investment. Focus for now on cases such that a
marginal change of investments e does not aect . Call such equilibrium
assignments static. Then investments that solve (4) must satisfy for each
i 2 I
X
a2A
 
@(a; a)
@ei
y(a; a) +
X
a0 6=a2A
@(a; a0)
@ei
y(a; a0)
2
!
=
@c(ei; i)
@ei
(5)
Since the rst derivative of expected surplus (1) decreases in investment ei,
as p(a; ei) is concave in ei, (5) is sucient as well, given the matching (a).
6If one is interested in surplus maximizing investments constrained on equilibrium
payos, i.e. taking joint surplus in each match as given by the equilibrium payos, it
suces to substitute maximal surplus y(a; a0) with equilibrium surplus y^(ai; aj) = ui +u

j
for all ai 2 (aj) in the optimization problem.
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Full Segregation
For instance, if surplus has to be split equally, matching takes the form of
full segregation, (a) = a for all a 2 A. If this remains the equilibrium
assignment for any investments e, then investments are surplus ecient if,
and only if, investments ei given by (3) satisfy condition (5). Under full
segregation (a; a) = q(a; e)=2 and (a; a0) = 0 for all a 6= a0 and (5) becomesX
a2A
y(a; a)
2
@p(a; ei)
@ei
=
@c(ei; i)
@ei
:
On the other hand, equal sharing of surplus implies that
P
a2A(
y(a;a)
2
 
v(a))@p(a;ei)
@ei
= 0. Hence, if full segregation is an equilibrium and equal sharing
of expected surplus maximizes joint surplus in each match (a; a), the social
planner cannot increase aggregate surplus by choosing dierent investments
or adjusting sharing rules. Therefore investments are surplus ecient. The
following proposition sums up the argument.
Proposition 1 (Full Segregation). Given an assignment of attributes (a) =
a and payos u, equilibrium attribute investments coincide with surplus max-
imizing investment levels if, and only if,X
a2A

y(a; a)
2
  E[(a; a; ua)]

@p(a; ei)
@ei
= 0 for all i 2 I;
This is implied by E[(a; a; ua)] = y(a; a)=2 for all a 2 A.
The condition that equal division of the payo is surplus ecient in a
match of agents with equal attributes seems likely to be satised in many
relevant applications. The following counterexample demonstrates that it
may fail, however, although rather extreme assumptions are needed.
Example: moral hazard in partnerships
Assume that in a match (i; j) revenue R(ai; aj) is realized with probability
g(xi; xj), depending on individual eort choices xi and xj as follows:
g(xi; xj) = x

i x
1 
j :
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Let   1=2. Exerting eort an agent i incurs utility cost x2i =2. In a match
agents may contract on the share s of the revenue that goes to i, but do not
use monetary transfers, e.g. due to liquidity constraints. Hence,
ui = sx

i x
1 
j R(ai; aj)  x2i =2 and uj = (1  s)xi x1 j R(ai; aj)  x2j=2:
Individual optimal eort choice pins down eort levels depending on s, xi(s)
and xj(s). Therefore individual payos depend also on s and are given by
ui(s) = s(s)
((1  )(1  s))1 (1  s=2)R(ai; aj)2 and
uj(s) = (1  s)(s)((1  )(1  s))1 (1  (1  )(1  s)=2)R(ai; aj)2:
That is, sharing rule s determines a pair of ui and uj and thus the joint
surplus in match (i; j). This can be used to construct the Pareto frontier,
(ai; aj; u) = argmax
s
ui(s) s.t. uj(s)  u:
Denote the sharing rule that maximizes joint surplus in a match (i; j) by
s = argmaxs ui(s) + uj(s), and the maximum joint surplus by y(ai; aj) =
ui(s
) + uj(s).
On the other hand, denote the sharing rule that allows equal sharing of
the joint surplus, such that that ui(s^) = uj(s^), by s^. Sharing the joint sur-
plus equally also maximizes joint surplus if and only if the eort investment
problem is symmetric, i.e. s^ = s if, and only if  = 1=2.
Figure 1 depicts (ai; aj; u) for three dierent matches (a; a), (a; a
0), and
(a0; a0) with a > a0. The 45 line pins down payos for equal sharing and the
dashed lines indicate the surplus maximizing payo sharing.
Suppose that (a) = a in equilibrium (this is implied by e.g. R(a; a)  
R(a; a0) suciently high for all a > a0, see Appendix). To check the condition
in Proposition 1, note that, whenever  > 1=2, for all a 2 A
y(a; a)=2  E[(a; a; ua)] = ()R(a; a)2;
for a constant () > 0 depending only on . Therefore investments are
not surplus ecient unless the investment technology (@p(a; ei)=@ei) exactly
compensates the dierences ()R(a; a)2.
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Figure 1: Utility Possibility Frontiers
Hence, a social planner who could enforce a dierent surplus distribution
than equal sharing can increase aggregate surplus. Suppose that sp = s^ + 
is enforced for each match (i; j). If R(a; a)   R(a; a0) is suciently high
for all a > a0 full segregation remains the equilibrium outcome and thus
ui(s
p) + uj(s
p) > ui(s^) + uj(s^) for all matches (i; j). This decreases the
dierence y(a; a)=2 E[(a; a; ua)] and increases both aggregate surplus and
investments.
3 Heterogeneous Matches
Allow now for equilibrium assignment of attributes  that do not induce full
segregation, i.e. (a) 6= a for some attribute a. Now changing investments
also changes the expected equilibrium match of at least some attributes,
aecting either only the measure of matched attribute pairs (a; a0) while 
remains unchanged, or aecting both (:) and .
The set of attributes and measures (:) dene an undirected, weighted
graph G with a set of vertices A, a set of edges E = f(a; a0) : a0 2 (a)g,
and the weights of edges (a; a0) given by (a; a0). Let C denote the set of
connected components in G. For instance, if surplus has to be shared equally
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(i.e.  = 1=2), this implies (a) = a (full segregation) and equilibrium payos
ui = y(ai; ai)=2. Therefore each vertex a 2 A has only one edge, (a; a), and
is a connected component, so that the set of components is C = A.
Here we limit our attention to graphs whose connected components c 2 C
have at most as many edges as vertices. Uniqueness of the matching equi-
librium implies this property. Otherwise, the surplus maximizing matching
market equilibrium given attributes necessarily has this property. See ap-
pendix for details on this and the next statement. Denote the sets of vertices
and edges in c by Ac and Ec. This then implies the following fact.
Fact 1. In a graph G associated to an equilibrium assignment  such that
jEcj  jAcj for each connected component c, in each connected component
either
(i) there is exactly one vertex a 2 Ac with a 2 (a) and c does not contain
a cycle, or
(ii) a =2 (a) for all a 2 Ac and jAcj = jEcj, then c contains one cycle of n
vertices fa1; :::;Ang and edges (an; a1) and (ai; ai+1) for i = 1; ::; n  1,
or
(iii) a =2 (a) for all a 2 Ac and jAcj > jEcj, then c has vertices fa1; :::;Ang
and edges and (ai; ai+1) for i = 1; ::; n  1.
That is, for each component either jAcj = jEcj and c contains a cycle or
an edge (a; a) (which is a cycle of length 0), or jAcj > jEcj and c has at least
two terminal vertices.
This observation can be tied to whether or not the equilibrium assignment
 will respond to a change in investments e. Recall that edge weights (:)
are dened by the system of equations (2). jAj > jEj is equivalent to G
having a component with vertices fa1; :::;Ang and edges and (ai; ai+1) for
i = 1; ::; n  1. Then for this component the weights solve
(ai; ai 1) = q(ai)  (ai+1; ai) for i = 2; :::; n  1; and
(a1; a2) = q(a1) and (an 1; an) = q(an):
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This means
nX
i=0
( 1)i+1q(ai; e) = 0:
Therefore a marginal change of investments e, changing measures q(a; e) in
turn, will typically violate the condition and the equilibrium assignment 
must change (adding new or removing old matches at a0 or an) in response
to a change in investments. This yields the following statement.
Fact 2. If, and only if, in the graph G associated to an equilibrium assign-
ment  the number of vertices strictly exceeds the number of edges, jAj > jEj,
then a marginal change in investment e implies that  is no longer an equi-
librium assignment.
The following denition characterizes equilibrium assignments  that do
not change in response to a marginal change in investments.
Denition 1. An equilibrium assignment  is static if the number of edges
in the graph G induced by  at least equals the number of vertices.
Intuitively, whenever component c contains as many edges as vertices, it
contains a cycle or a vertex a 2 Ac with a 2 (a), so that any marginal change
in measures q(a; e) can be accommodated by adjusting weights of edges in
the cycle, or (a; a), without needing to adjust the graph. In particular, the
assignment (a) = a for all a 2 A, i.e. full segregation as above, is static.
For instance, suppose that A = fa1; a2g and the equilibrium assignment
is (a1) = fa1; a2g and (a2) = a1, inducing (a1; a2) = q(a2)=q(a1). Then
graph G contains one connected component, G, which in turn contains two
edges and two vertices. A marginal change in e marginally changes q(a1) and
q(a2), and therefore (a1; a2), but any change in (a1; a2) is counterbalanced
by (a1; a1) = 1   (a1; a2). If the equilibrium assignment is (a1) = a2
and (a2) = a1, however, the single connected component of G contains only
one edge (a1; a2), but two vertices. Then a marginal change in e changes
q(a1) and q(a2) and, since
P @p(ai;ei)
@ei
= 0, the matching given by , with
(a1; a2) = 1=2 relying on q(a1; e) = q(a2; e), becomes impossible.
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3.1 Static Assignments
Focus for now on static equilibrium assignments . In this case (5) is a suf-
cient and necessary condition for a solution of the social planner's problem
(4). The LHS of (5) can be decomposed into the set of disjoint connected
components C, since by denition (a; a0) = 0 for any a 2 Ac and a0 =2 Ac:X
c2C
X
a2Ac
 
@(a; a)
@ei
y(a; a) +
X
a0 6=a2Ac
@(a; a0)
@ei
y(a; a0)
2
!
:
The following analysis will distinguish between cases (i) and (ii) of Fact 1.
Case 1: no cycles
Start with case (i), i.e. focus on a component c that contains exactly one
a 2 Ac with a 2 (a); denote it by a0. Dene the distance d(a; a0) of two
vertices a; a0 2 c by the number of edges in the shortest path connecting
them, e.g. d(a; a0) = 1 if and only if a0 2 (a). Let n = maxa2Ac d(a0; a) the
maximum distance from vertex a0. Dene by A
c
i = fa 2 Ac : d(a0; a) = ig
the set of vertices that have common distance i from a0. Figure 2 shows an
example.
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##G
GG
GG
GG
G
GFED@ABCa01 oo //cc
##G
GG
GG
GG
G
GFED@ABCa2 oo // GFED@ABCa3
GFED@ABCa01 GFED@ABCa02
Figure 2: Example for a component c with one vertex a0 that links to itself.
The eects of a change of investments on attributes in component c,
c =
X
a2Ac
 
@(a; a)
@ei
y(a; a) +
X
a0 6=a2Ac
@(a; a0)
@ei
y(a; a0)
2
!
can be derived by summing up the eects on each match (a; a0) in c ordered
by their distance from a0:
c =y(a0; a0)
@(a0; a0)
@ei
+
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)
y(ai 1; ai)
@(ai 1; ai)
@ei
1A :
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Let ai 2 Aci and ai 1 2 Aci 1. Then (ai 1; ai) = q(ai; e) if ai is a terminal
vertex, i.e. (ai) = ai 1, and for ai, i  1, that are not terminal vertices
(ai 1; ai) = q(ai; e) 
X
ai+12(ai)\Aci+1
(ai; ai+1):
Finally, (a0; a0) = (a0)=2 
P
a12Ac1 (a0; a1). These observations imply
c =
y(a0; a0)
2
@p(a0; ei)
@ei
+
X
a12Ac1

y(a0; a1)  y(a0; a0)
2

@p(a1; ei)
@ei
+
X
a22Ac2
X
a12Ac1\(a2)

y(a1; a2)  y(a0; a1) + y(a0; a0)
2

@p(a2; ei)
@ei
+ :::+
+
X
an2Acn
X
an 12An 1\(an)

y(an 1; an)  :::( 1)ny(a0; a0)
2

@p(an; ei)
@ei
:
Dene the \externality" that vertices closer to a0 have on those further apart
by
x(ai) = y(ai 1; ai)  x(ai 1) for i = 1; :::; n; (6)
and x(a0) = y(a0; a0)=2. Then
c =
y(a0; a0)
2
@p(a0; ei)
@ei
+
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)
(y(ai 1; ai)  x(ai 1)) @p(ai; ei)
@ei
1A:
(7)
To verify whether surplus ecient investments coincide with equilibrium
investments recall that the latter were determined byX
c2C
X
a2Ac
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
=
@c(a; ei )
@ei
:
Hence, for each component c
c =
X
a2Ac
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
is equivalent to
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)
(y(ai 1; ai)  x(ai 1)  v(ai)) @p(ai; e

i )
@ei
1A
+

y(a0; a0)
2
  v(a0)

@p(a0; e

i )
@ei
= 0: (8)
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This is implied by v(ai) = y(ai 1; ai) x(ai 1) for all ai 2 ACi and ai 1 2 Aci 1
for all distances i = 1; :::; n. Since by denition x(ai) = y(ai 1; ai)  x(ai 1),
this means that
v(ai) = y(ai 1; ai)  v(ai 1) for i > 0; and v(a0) = y(a0; a0)=2; (9)
implies (8). Note that (9) characterizes the equilibrium payos supporting a
stable matching under fully transferable utility. Hence, if equilibrium payos
do not coincide with the payos in a matching market equilibrium under
fully transferable utility, the condition v(ai) = y(ai 1; ai)   x(ai 1) will fail
for some attributes. Unless distortions for some attribute aj with j > i
exactly compensate this, (8) will fail. Note that even if for some attributes
ai and aj the respective distortions in payo exactly oset each other, this
will no longer be the case for a slight change of @p(a;ei)
@ei
, that is, a marginal
perturbation of the investment technology.
Case 2: cycles
The case when c has a cycle is a generalization of the one above, by allowing
for cycles that have length greater than 0. Dene the distance dc(a) of a
vertex a 2 Ac to the cycle by the number of edges in the shortest path
connecting them, e.g. dc(a) = 0 if and only if a is part of the cycle. Let
n = maxa2Ac dc(a) the maximum distance from the cycle. Dene by Aci =
fa 2 Ac : dc(a) = ig the set of vertices that have common distance i from
the cycle. Figure 3 shows an example.
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Figure 3: Example for a component c with a cycle (vertices a0, a
0
0, and a
00
0).
Again the eects of a change of investments on attributes in component
c, c can be derived by summing up the eects on each match (a; a0) in c
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ordered by their distance from the cycle:
c =
X
a02Ac0
X
a002(a0)\Ac0
y(a0; a
0
0)
2
@(a0; a
0
0)
@ei
+
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)
y(ai 1; ai)
@(ai 1; ai)
@ei
1A :
Let ai 2 Aci and ai 1 2 Aci 1. Then (ai 1; ai) = q(ai; e) if ai is a terminal
vertex, i.e. (ai) = ai 1. (ai 1; ai) = q(ai; e) 
P
ai+12(ai)\Aci+1 (ai; ai+1) and
for vertices a0 and a
0
0; a
00
0 2 (a0) in the cycle, it must hold that (a0; a00) +
(a0; a
00
0) = (a0) 
P
a12(a0)\Ac1 .
Denote by n0 = (jAc0j + 1)=2 the maximum distance between any two
vertices on the cycle. Then the \externality" that vertices closer to a0 have
on those further apart can be expressed as
x(a0) =
1
2
n0 1X
i=0
( 1)i
X
a;a02Ac0: d(a;a0)=d(a0;a0) 1
y(a; a0); (10)
and using the denition of x(ai) above,
c =
X
a02Ac0
x(a0)
@p(a0; ei)
@ei
+
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)
(y(ai 1; ai) x(ai 1))@p(ai; ei)
@ei
1A:
(11)
This expression coincides with (7) if Ac0 = a0, i.e. a cycle of length 0.
To verify whether equilibrium investments satisfy (5) note again that for
each component c
c =
X
a2Ac
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
is equivalent to
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)
(y(ai 1; ai)  x(ai 1)  v(ai)) @p(ai; e

i )
@ei
1A
+
X
a02Ac0
(x(a0)  v(a0))@p(a0; e

i )
@ei
= 0: (12)
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Note that (12) becomes (8) if the cycle only has one edge (a0; a0). Here
v(a0) = x(a0) holds if payos v(a0) solve the system of equations
v(a0) = y(a0; a
0
0)  v(a00) for all a0; a00 2 Ac0 with a0 2 (a00):
Repeating the argument made above, if equilibrium payos do not coincide
with the payos in a matching market equilibrium under fully transferable
utility, the conditions v(ai) = y(ai 1; ai)   x(ai 1) or v(a0) = x(a0) will
fail for some attributes. These arguments are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Static Assignments). Suppose an equilibrium assignment 
is static. Then equilibrium investments coincide with the ones chosen by a
surplus maximizing social planner if, and only if,
X
c2C
nX
i=1
0@X
ai2Aci
X
ai 12Aci 1\(ai)

x(ai)  (ai 1; ai; uai 1)
 @p(ai; ei )
@ei
1A
+
X
c2C
X
a02Ac0
(x(a0)  v(a0))@p(a0; e

i )
@ei
= 0;
where x(ai) is dened by (6) and (10).
This condition is satised if equilibrium payos u coincide with equilib-
rium payos under fully transferable utility ((a; a0; u) = y(a; a0)  u).
That is, if equilibrium payos coincide with those under perfectly trans-
ferable utility, then the equilibrium allocation coincides with the one chosen
by the social planner. Otherwise, distortions in incentives that arise for
some equilibrium matches of attributes typically matter in aggregate. In
case payo distortion for dierent attributes happen to exactly compensate
each other, surplus eciency is not robust to a marginal perturbation in
the investment technology p(a; ei). Note that Proposition 2 implies Proposi-
tion 1. The following examples illustrates Proposition 2 and emphasizes the
condition may fail despite surplus eciency of equilibrium payos.
Example: Heterogenous Matches
Let A = fa0; a1g and assume that surplus has to be shared according to
sharing rule ua = (a; a
0)y(a; a0) and (a; a0) = 1  (a; a0). Let (a; a) = 1=2
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for all a 2 A for the sake of simplicity. Suppose that (a0) = fa0; a1g and
(a1) = a0, to keep the notation similar to the one used above (the reverse
case is analogous). This is consistent with a matching market equilibrium if
y(a1; a1)
2y(a0; a1)
 (a1; a0)  1  y(a0; a0)
2y(a0; a1)
: (GDD)
The condition in Proposition 2 becomes
y(a0; a1)  y(a0; a0)
2
  (a1; a0)y(a0; a1)

@p(a1; ei)
@ei
+

y(a0; a0)
2
  y(a0; a0)
2

@p(a0; ei)
@ei
= 0:
Note that here y(a0; a1) y(a0; a0) gives the social marginal benet of turning
an a0 attribute into an a1 attribute (since p(a0; ei) = 1   p(a1; ei)), i.e.,
exchanging an (a0; a0) match for an (a0; a1) match. Since utility is perfectly
transferable in (a; a) matches the condition reduces to
[1  (a1; a0)]y(a0; a1)@p(a1; ei)
@ei
=
y(a0; a0)
2
@p(a1; ei)
@ei
:
This holds if and only if @p(a1;ei)
@ei
= 0, which would imply p(a; ei) is a constant,
or
(a1; a0) = 1  y(a0; a0)
2y(a0; a1)
:
Therefore, in this example ex ante investments e are surplus ecient given
matching  if, and only if, (a; a0)y(a; a0) coincide with payos under fully
transferable utility. Otherwise by (GDD) (a1; a0) is \too small", inducing
over-investment in attribute a0. Then a social planner can change investment
levels without changing the matching pattern  and induce higher aggregate
surplus. This cannot induce a Pareto improvement, however.
The failure to induce ecient investments despite ex post surplus e-
ciency of equilibrium payos in the example is due to the failure of the equal
treatment property in the example. To see this suppose that the equal treat-
ment property holds, i.e. v(ai) = (ai; aj; u

j) for all aj 2 (ai) for all ai 2 A.
Denote the joint payo in a match of attributes a and a0 by
y^(a; a0) = v(a) + v(a0):
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Then v(ai) = y^(ai 1; ai)   v(ai 1) for ai 2 Aci and ai 1 2 Aci 1 \ (ai) for
distances i = 1; ::; n in component c of the graph G. Moreover, v(a0) with
a0 2 Ac0 solve
v(a0) = y^(a0; a
0
0)  v(a00) for all a0; a00 2 Ac0 with a0 2 (a00):
Then the condition in Proposition 2 is satised if, and only if, y(a; a0) =
y^(a; a0) for all a; a0 2 A such that a0 2 (a). Note that this result is robust to
a perturbation of the investment technology p(a; ei). This means that if an
equilibrium assignment  is static and the equal treatment property holds for
equilibrium payos u, then equilibrium investments coincide with the ones
chosen by a surplus maximizing social planner for any investment technology
p(a; ei) if, and only if, equilibrium payos u
 are surplus ecient ex post, i.e.
y(a; a0) = v(a) + v(a0) for all a; a0 2 A with a0 2 (a). This means that
whenever the equal treatment property holds, a social planner who cannot
alter the sharing of surplus nor the match, cannot increase aggregate surplus
by changing investments.
Corollary 1. Suppose an equilibrium assignment  is static and the equal
treatment property holds for equilibrium payos u. Then investments e are
surplus ecient if, and only if, equilibrium payos u maximize joint surplus
in each match.
The following statement gives a relation between the primitives in form
of the degree of utility transferability and the equal treatment property for
equilibrium payos, details are in the appendix.
Proposition 3 (Equal Treatment Property). The equal treatment property
holds in a matching market equilibrium (; u) if (a; a0; u) is continuous and
dierentiable in u and for all a; a0 2 A for u 2 [0; (a; a0; 0)
0 <
@(a; a0; u)
@u
<  1:
The condition in the proposition implies that for any match (a; a0) and
given some feasible sharing of surplus, marginally increasing the surplus of
one agent marginally decreases the surplus of the other agent, independently
of whether this decreases or increases joint surplus. Note that this property
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is implied if partners in match can exchange utility at a bounded, positive
rate for every feasible division of surplus.
That is, if utility is transferable at the margin at any feasible surplus
sharing, a matching market equilibrium will have the equal treatment prop-
erty, and equilibrium investments will be surplus ecient constrained on the
match  and partners' joint surpluses implied by equilibrium payos u.
3.2 Non-static Assignments
Focus now on equilibrium assignments  that are not static and contain a
component c satisfying case (iii) of Fact 1. A change of investments e and the
subsequent changes in q(a; e) trigger a change in the equilibrium assignment
, since there is no cycle in c to adjust to balance any excess or shortfall of
attributes. Then the marginal benet from investment may jump at e. This
is because changing investment will decrease the measure of some matches
and increase the one of some other. Increasing or decreasing investment will
typically aect dierent kind of matches, however. Surplus eciency requires
that the social marginal cost of investment lies between the dierent social
marginal returns of increasing or decreasing investment. Hence, there will be
a set of ecient investment levels.GFED@ABCa0 oo // GFED@ABCa1 GFED@ABCa0((  oo // GFED@ABCa1 GFED@ABCa0 oo // GFED@ABCa1 vv


Figure 4: Graphs for an assignment  that is not static (left), and for the
corresponding assignments  (middle) and  (right).
For instance, let A = fa0; a1g and y(a1; a1) > y(a0; a1) > y(a0; a0). Sup-
pose that (a0) = a1 and (a1) = a0 for equilibrium investments e
. Let
p(a1; ei) increase in ei. Then decreasing investments generates assignment
 with (a0) = fa0; a1g and (a1) = a0. Increasing investments generates
 with (a0) = a1 and fa0; a1g = a1. Figure 4 shows these assignments.
Using (11) this implies that investments e dened by q(a0; e) = q(a1; e)
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are surplus ecient if, and only if,
[y(a1; a1) y(a0; a1)]@p(a1; e

i )
@ei
 @c(e

i; i)
@ei
 [y(a0; a1) y(a0; a0)]@p(a1; e

i )
@ei
:
(13)
This condition is satised by a variety of investment choices. To check
whether equilibrium investments e satisfy the above condition, recall that
e is given by
P
a2A v(a)@p(a; e

i )=@ei = @c(e

i ; i)=@ei for each i 2 I. This
and (13) imply that equilibrium investments are ecient if, and only if,
y(a1; a1) y(a0; a1)  v(a1)  v(a0)  y(a0; a1) y(a0; a0):
Since q(a0; e
) = q(a1; e) is a stable match, equilibrium payos v(a) have
to satisfy v(a0)  v(a0) and v(a1)  v(a1) where v(a) and v(a), denote the
equilibrium payos for attribute a0 and a1 in assignments  and . Therefore
v(a1)  v(a0)  v(a1)  v(a0)  v(a1)  v(a0):
Hence, investments e such that q(a0; e) = q(a1; e) are surplus ecient i
y(a1; a1) y(a0; a1)  v(a1)  v(a0) and
v(a1)  v(a0)  y(a0; a1) y(a0; a0):
If the equal treatment property holds for assignments  and  the above
condition is clearly satised whenever (ai; aj; v(aj)) = y(ai; aj)  v(aj) and
(ai; aj; v(aj)) = y(ai; aj)   v(aj) for all ai; aj 2 A. That is, under equal
treatment investments are surplus ecient if equilibrium payos maximize
the joint surplus in each match in assignments  and .
Again, surplus eciency of payos v(:) and v(:) is necessary, but not
necessarily sucient for surplus ecient investments. See the appendix for
an counterexample where payo maximizes joint surplus ex post, but the
equal treatment property does not hold.
The logic in this simple example extends to more general settings as stated
in the following proposition, the details are in the appendix. For each type 
denote by  () the equilibrium assignment that arises if all agents of type
 increase (decrease) their investment ei.
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Proposition 4. Suppose an equilibrium assignment  is not static. If the
equal treatment property holds for payos for all equilibrium assignments 

and , then surplus eciency of equilibrium payos associated to the equi-
librium assignments implies that equilibrium investments are surplus ecient
for any investment technology.
The following theorem summarizes Propositions 2, 3, 4, and Corollary 1,
and gives the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 (Surplus Eciency of Ex Ante Investments). Suppose that utility
is suciently transferable in the sense that for all a; a0 2 A (a; a0; u) is
dierentiable in u and
0 >
@(a; a0; u)
@u
>  1 for u 2 [0; (a; a0; 0)]:
Then equilibrium investments are constrained surplus ecient, so that a so-
cial planner cannot increase aggregate surplus by changing only investments.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has shown that competition in large matching markets induces
ex ante investments that are surplus ecient constrained on the equilibrium
assignment for reasonably general investment technologies if, and only if,
equilibrium payos in all matches coincide with payos under fully transfer-
able utility. Otherwise a social planner could increase aggregate surplus by
marginally adjusting individual investments and forcing marginally dierent
sharing of surplus in matches, while maintaining the equilibrium assignment.
Moreover, ex post surplus eciency of equilibrium payos is a sucient
condition for surplus ecient investment only if equilibrium payos satisfy
the equal treatment property. This property holds if utility is transferable
enough to enable partners in any match to transfer utility at a nite, strictly
positive rate for any division of surplus. Indeed, this induces sucient ex-
ibility in market payos to enable the accurate pricing of all externalities
generated by an agent's investment choice given the limitations in utility
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transferability. In this case a social planner cannot increase aggregate sur-
plus by changing individual investments alone, even when payos are not
surplus ecient ex post.
One particular case that necessarily satises equal treatment in equilib-
rium is when the matching equilibrium takes the form of full segregation
generating only homogenous matches. In this case ex post surplus eciency
of payos implies surplus eciency of investments conditional on the equilib-
rium assignment. Whenever the equilibrium assignment involves heteroge-
neous matches, however, equal treatment need not be the case, in particular
when payos have to be shared according to xed ratios, for instance because
of renegotiations.
Many of the eciency results derived above are conditional on the equilib-
rium assignment of agents. While leaving open the possibility of coordination
failure as a consequence of rational expectation (explored e.g. by Bhaskar and
Hopkins, 2011, in a two-sided framework), this has some interesting implica-
tion when the matching of individuals is used as a policy tool, for instance
in form of armative action or team formation. Such policies will therefore
yield constrained ecient investments, conditional on the matching that is
imposed and the degree of transferability. Indeed, Gall et al. (2009) exam-
ines the eects of such policies on ex ante investments and their aggregate
consequences.
A Mathematical Appendix
Details for example: moral hazard in partnerships
Optimal eort choices xi(s) and xj(s) depend on s and satisfy
xi(s) = (s)
1+
2 ((1  )(1  s)) 1 2 R(ai; aj) and
xj(s) = (s)

2 ((1  )(1  s)) 2 2 R(ai; aj):
The sharing rule s that maximizes joint payo ui(s) + uj(s) solves
max
s
(s)((1  )(1  s))1 R(ai; aj)2[1  (s2 + (1  )(1  s)2)=2]:
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Note that the surplus maximizing sharing rule s is a function of  but not
of R(a; a), and s = 1=2 if and only if  = 1=2. Maximal surplus in match
(i; j), y(ai; aj) = ui(s
) + uj(s) is
y(ai; aj)=(s
)((1 )(1 s))1 2 (s
)2+(1 )(1 s)2
2
R(ai; aj)
2:
Setting ui(s^) = uj(s^) implies s^ = 1=2 if  = 1=2 and otherwise
s^ =
1 +  p(1 + )(2  )
2  1 :
Indeed s^ = 1=2 = s for  = 1=2. Otherwise s > s^ since the sum ui(s)+uj(s)
strictly increases in s at s = s^.
Finally, to check the condition in Proposition 1, compute the dierence
in y(a; a)=2 = (ui(s
) + uj(s))=2 and ui(s^) = uj(s^) = (a; a; ua):
y(a; a)
2
  (a; a; ua) =
y(a; a)
2

s^
s

1  s^
1  s
1 
2  s^2   (1  )(1  s^)2
2  (s)2   (1  )(1  s)2 :
Since neither s nor s^ depend on R(a; a) the dierence is a constant fraction
of R(a; a)2.
Note that a sucient condition for full segregation in equilibrium for any
sharing of surplus is that the maximum utility attribute a can obtain when
matching with a0 < a falls short of sharing the surplus in a (a; a) match, that
is, if for all a; a0 2 A with a0 < a
s
s^
1+
1  s
1  s^
1 
2  s
2  s^ <

R(a; a)
R(a; a0)
2
; (14)
where s = argmaxs ui(s),
s =
4 + 2 + 2  p(2  )(8  62   3)
6
:
Note that (14) holds whenever the additional revenue generated by another
high attribute R(a; a) R(a; a0) is suciently great for all attributes.
Edges and Vertices
A necessary condition for a unique matching equilibrium (:) is that jEcj 
jAcj. Otherwise the system of equations
q(a; e) =
X
a02(a)
(a; a0) + 2(a; a) for a 2 Ac (15)
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has a solution 1 such that 1(a; a
0) = 0 for some a; a0 2 Ac. Since all
matches dened by  cannot be blocked by other matches as  is a matching
equilibrium, the assignment dened by 1 must be a matching equilibrium as
well, with 1 6= . Hence, jEcj  jAcj is a necessary condition for uniqueness
of .
Suppose a matching equilibrium  such that jEcj > jAcj. Then the max-
imal surplus choosing  satisfying (15) can be achieved by a choice of  with
(a; a0) = 0 for some a; a0 2 Ac. Otherwise  can still be changed such that
surplus weakly increases, since if there is a change of  that strictly decreases
total surplus there must an opposite change that increases total surplus.
Finally, suppose that a matching equilibrium satises the equal treatment
property and has jEcj > jAcj. Then choosing  such that (a; a0) = 0 for
some a; a0 2 Ac will not alter payos since by the equal treatment property
all attributes are indierent between all their matches.
Proof of Fact 1
(i) Let a component c of G induced by an equilibrium assignment  contain
some a such that a 2 (a). Suppose that c also contains a cycle. Then
jEcj > jAcj, since a cycle has as many edges as vertices. The same argument
can be applied to the case of c containing some a0 6= a with a0 2 (a0) thus
establishing the rst statement.
(ii) If a =2 (a) for all a 2 Ac and c can be a chain or cycle. Suppose the
latter then j(a)j = 2, since otherwise the number of edges would exceed the
number of vertices in c.
(iii) Suppose a =2 (a) for all a 2 Ac and c is a chain, that is c contains
some terminal node a, i.e. (a) = a0 with a 6= a0. This implies that jAcj >
jEcj.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose the condition in the proposition holds, but equal treatment in equi-
librium does not. Then in equilibrium there is an attribute ai with ak; aj 2
(ai) such that (ai; aj; u

j) > (ai; ak; u

k). But then an agent with attribute
ai who is matched to an agent with an attribute ak, and an agent with an
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attribute aj who is matched to an agent with attribute ai, nd it both strictly
protable to match together if there are payos (ai; ak; u

k) + i with i > 0
for the one with ai and u

j + j with j > 0 for the one with aj, such that
(ai; ak; u

k) + i  (ai; aj; uj + j):
Since (ai; aj; u

j) > (ai; ak; u

k) by assumption, condition (A) is ensured if
the function (ai; ak; u) is continuous in u and strictly decreasing with a slope
bounded away from  1. Noting that (a; a0; u) is non-increasing in u by
denition, this is implied by the condition in the proposition.
Example when the assignment is not static
Turn now to an example where deviating matchings  and  do not involve
homogenous matches. For this let A = f0; 1; 2g and assume that y(a; a0) =p
a+ a0. Let p(1; ei) = p(2; ei) = ei=2 and suppose c(ei; i) = ie2 and set
i = 1=2 for all i 2 I.
Surplus can be split equally in homogenous matches but has to be shared
according to rule ij between attributes ai and aj. Suppose that in a matching
equilibrium (0) = 2 and (2) = 0, and (1) = 1. Since investments are
pinned down by equilibrium payos (02
p
2 +
p
2=2)=2  (1  02)
p
2, 02 =
1=2 + 4=(9
p
2) ensures that e = 2=3 which in turn ensures that q(0; e) =
q(2; e).
Stability requires 02
p
2  1, which is true. Suppose moreover that 01 >p
2=2 but (1  02)
p
2 > 1  01, and that (1  12)
p
3 >
p
2=2 but 02
p
2 >
12
p
3  1 (that is, 1 agents prefer 0 and 2 agents over 1 agents but 0 and 2
prefer each other).
These assumptions imply also that increasing investment yields additional
(1; 2) matches, decreasing investment yields additional (0; 1) matches. Hence,
investments are surplus ecient if, and only if
[y(0; 2)  y(1; 2)] @p(0; e

i )
@ei
+ [y(1; 2)  y(1; 1)] @p(2; e

i )
@ei
 2=3
2=3  [y(0; 1)  y(1; 1)] @p(0; e

i )
@ei
+ [y(0; 2)  y(0; 1)] @p(2; e

i )
@ei
:
Using the functional forms dened above reveals that the second condition
fails. Hence, there is over-investment, in the sense that decreasing invest-
28
ments ei will increase aggregate surplus in the new matching market equilib-
rium corresponding to the decreased investments.
Proof of Proposition 4
Denote by G and G the graphs associated to 

and , and their set of
connected components by C and C. Equilibrium investments e are surplus
ecient if for each i 2 I of type 
@c(ei ; )
@ei
2
24X
c2C
c;
X
c2C
c
35 ; (16)
using the expression derived above for c for each connected component of
the graphs G and G (note both graphs G and G will be typically static).
Since the cost is strictly convex
P
c2C 
c <
P
c2C 
c.
Stability of the assignment  generating a cycle in component c implies
that for all a 2 A
v(a)  (a; a0; v(a0)) for all a0 2 A:
This implies in particular that for all agents i of type 
@c(ei ; )
@ei
2
24X
c2C
X
a2c
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
;
X
c2C
X
a2c
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
35 ; (17)
where v(a) and v(a) denote the equilibrium payos in matchings 

and
 as dened above. Since investment cost is convex,
P
a2A v(a)
@p(a;ei )
@ei
<P
a2A v(a)
@p(a;ei )
@ei
.
Eciency of investments in any matching equilibrium that is not static
therefore requires thatX
c2C
c 
X
a2A
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei
and
X
a2A
v(a)
@p(a; ei )
@ei

X
c2C
c: (18)
Note that by the arguments above lower and upper bounds coincide if equi-
librium payos coincide with those when utility is perfectly transferable.
Otherwise the investment technology has to exactly oset any distortions.
Corollary 1 implies that if the equal treatment property holds for equilib-
rium payos in matches  and  surplus eciency of equilibrium payos
implies that both conditions in (18) hold with equality.
29
References
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole: 2012, `Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screen-
ing, and Multitasking'. Working Paper.
Bhaskar, V. and E. Hopkins: 2011, `Marriage as a Rat Race: Noisy Pre-
Marital Investments with Assortative Matching'. Working Paper Univer-
sity College London.
Cole, H. L., G. J. Mailath, and A. Postlewaite: 2001a, `Ecient Non-
Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy'. Advances in Theoretical
Economics 1(2).
Cole, H. L., G. J. Mailath, and A. Postlewaite: 2001b, `Ecient Non-
contractible Investments in Large Economies'. Journal of Economic Theory
101, 333{373.
Dizdar, D.: 2012, `Two-sided Investments and Matching with Multi-
dimensional Attributes'. Working Paper University of Bonn.
Felli, L. and K. Roberts: 2002, `Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Prob-
lem?'. CEPR Discussion Paper Series 3535.
Gall, T., P. Legros, and A. F. Newman: 2006, `The Timing of Education'.
Journal of the European Economic Association 4(2-3), 427{435.
Gall, T., P. Legros, and A. F. Newman: 2009, `Mismatch, Rematch, and
Investments'. Working Paper Boston University.
Harsanyi, J. C.: 1953, `Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the
Theory of Risk-Taking'. Journal of Political Economy 61(5), 434{435.
Kaneko, M. and M. H. Wooders: 1986, `The Core of a Game with a Con-
tinuum of Players and Finite Coalitions: the Model and Some Results'.
Mathematical Social Sciences 12, 105{137.
Legros, P. and A. F. Newman: 2007, `Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: As-
sortative Matching with Nontransferabilities'. Econometrica 75(4), 1073{
1102.
30
Mailath, G. J., A. Postlewaite, and L. Samuelson: 2012, `Pricing and Invest-
ments in Matching Markets'. Theoretical Economics (forthcoming).
Mas-Colell, A.: 1984, `On a Theorem of Schmeidler'. Journal of Mathematical
Economics 13, 201{206.
Peters, M. and A. Siow: 2002, `Competing Pre-marital Investments'. Journal
of Political Economy 110, 592{608.
31
